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Discussion Following the Remarks of
Mr. Peter Suchman and Mr. Robert Latimer

QUESTION, ProfessorHenry King, Jr.: Mr. Suchman, considering
the realistic problems you've discussed, where do you think corrections
have to be made in standing U.S. legislation in order for a free-trade
agreement to work?
ANSWER, Mr. Suchman: The answer concerns both substantive
and procedural issues. There have been a large number of procedural
changes in the U.S. trade remedy laws over the past fifteen years. Before
1974, the U.S. countervailing duty law was one paragraph; now it's an
entire chapter of a title statute. There is no simple answer to what
changes need be made.
One area that will have to be eonsidered is subsidies. This is of particular interest to Canada, which feels it must continue to subsidize to
encourage industrial growth. What must first be done is an identification
of those Canadian programs which the U.S. considers to be subsidiessome of which remarkably resemble the U.S. agricultural support programs-and perhaps an agreement not to take action against those considered important or essential. Another modification might be in the
Fair Trade Practice statutes, with some special consideration given to
Canadian producers, as part of a movement towards a truly North
American market.
There are limits to what can be done procedurally, but Canada
could be given special consideration under those statutes which are enforced within the discretion of the President. Canada is given special
consideration now: before any action is taken against a broad range of
imports under the escape clause, early consultations are held. And, in
another area, while voluntary restraints in steel imports are being negotiated with ten different countries, none is being negotiated with Canadaan acknowledgment of Canada's special trading relationship.
QUESTION, Mr. Jon Fried: I would appreciate the views of both
Mr. Suchman and Mr. Latimer as to whether a bilateral dispute settlement mechanism is desirable and/or feasible compared to unilateral domestic legislation. Also, is the intellectual property issue one of growing
concern, particularly in the area of technology and manufacturing
processes?
ANSWER, Mr.Suchman: First of all, I don't think there is likely to
a "supernational court" to which countries would bring
established
be
their antidumping complaints. It is possible that a bilateral commission
could be established, though I think it would be difficult. At first, some-
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thing less auspicious would have to be started-if a truly North American market were established.
One type of unfair trade practice is a violation of a patent, copyright
or trademark. This concerns the area of "gray goods," which are legitimate trademarked goods produced abroad but brought into the U.S. in
contravention of the licensee arrangement. Today, neither the U.S.
courts or the President have excluded such products. The whole area of
ownership rights and international trade needs further exploration.
ANSWER, Mr. Latimer: Regarding a dispute settlement system, I
think it would be better to institutionalize the consultative process and
avoid reaching the dispute stage. It is better to discuss a problem than to
refer to a third party for settlement of a dispute.
COMMENT, Mr. Suchman: One of the problems in consultative
mechanisms are the time restraints. For example, in a countervailing
duty case under the Unfair Trade Practice laws, there are only eighty-five
days from the time the petition is filed until the Commerce Department
must make a preliminary determination, which begins accrual of potential liability. There is not much time to set up an international consultation to determine if there was an agreement not to countervail on this
particular product. There has to be some loosening of U.S. procedure
before a bilateral agreement can be functional.
QUESTION, Mr. Alan Wolff. Mr. Suchman talked about the difficulty of amending U.S. trade remedy laws in Congress. Would Mr. Latimer describe what difficulty there might be, in Canada, to exempt U.S.
trade from Canadian remedy laws, if this were reciprocated by the
United States?
ANSWER, Mr. Latimer: First of all, the most extensively used Canadian remedy law is the antidumping law, and 75% of the reasons for
dumping would be removed if there were no tariff.
There is nothing in Canadian law that would preclude negotiating
anything mutually agreeable. Politically, however, Canada is not prepared for the demise of a particular sector of the economy due to massive
dumping. As to a reciprocal U.S. agreement, the disposition would be to
deal with problems of fair competition injury by other methods than border measures.
A Canada-U.S. free-trade agreement would not be constrained by
Canadian law. But, the Canadian economy has to be structurally
brought up to date and made responsive to the international competitive
environment. There are compelling reasons for this: a high tariff does
not result in foreign investment supplying the Canadian market. Both
politically and economically, Canada must adjust and become competitive, especially in the U.S.-Canadian market.
QUESTION,Mr. JacquesRoy: Mr. Suchman, is it possible, from an
economic point of view, to reach an agreement with Canada whereby
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neither country would have countervailing duty or antidumping
investigations?
ANSWER, Mr. Suchman: From the U.S. perspective, it would be
very difficult, if not impossible, at the present time to reach such an
agreement. But, I think some sensible limits might be placed on these
remedies, which are not the best way of protecting a market. Antidumping is a concept which has outlived its usefulness. Concentration should
be directed to whether the goods are injurious and towards structural
adjustments that can be made, rather than taking antidumping actions.
COMMENT, ProfessorRobert Hudec: It seems the prerequisite for
doing something substantial about antidumping and countervailing duty
is to change the conceptual framework of the problem. As long as Canadian producers are regarded as foreign producers operating in a different
environment, there will always be some kind of compensatory mechanism to deal with perceived unfair trade practices.
If we are serious about a free-trade agreement, then the concept of
intergovernmental agencies should be considered. With an "intergovernmental unfair trade body," which would utilize both antitrust and discriminatory pricing concepts, we could begin to make the kind of
conceptual adjustments necessary to get political acceptance of a separate
and more liberal regime.
In regards to the need for a dispute settlement mechanism, one of
the uses of such a system is to aid government officials to make the decisions necessary for implementing the agreement. In any free-trade agreement there will be problems of interpretation. If dispute settlement is left
only to a consultative process, the results will be less satisfactory than if
an opinion is rendered by a third party which both countries have agreed
to accept.
COMMENT, Mr. FrankStone: It should be remembered that under
the GATT both countries have access to a dispute settlement procedure,
although it can only be used in interpreting the rules of the GATT. If
Canada and the United States go beyond the GATT agreement, they
could still use that mechanism to settle disputes which would otherwise
come under the GATT and supplement the process with a bilateral
agency.
COMMENT, ProfessorKing: I'd like to call attention to the American and Canadian Bar Associations' work on this problem. I was chairman on the U.S. side and Bill Graham was a member of the Joint
Working Group from the Canadian side. We have proposed a procedure
for the arbitration of disputes which would be a good reference point for
the dispositional type of settlement, as opposed to a joint solution type
such as the IJC. In any event, this is an area which needs further
exploration.

